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As part of the 2017 Audit of UK Democracy, Stuart Brown examines the extent to which the UK’s participation in
European and international institutions affects the quality of UK democracy. Overall, while some positive reforms
have taken place at the European level since 2012, the UK’s uncertain relationship with the European Union and a
general lack of transparency in international organisations remain key areas of concern.
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What does democracy require for participation in cross-national or international
organisations?
Cross-national or international organisations are very rarely controlled via directly democratic
procedures (e.g. population-proportional representation in decision-making bodies). Most such
bodies rely on reaching relatively high levels of agreement amongst member states, plus an
ethos of respecting the fundamental interests and autonomy of states.
Still, so far as possible, cross-national bodies should allow for citizens’ views and interests to
be gauged and represented directly, not just indirectly by their member state government.
Cross-national and international organisations should be fully transparent so as to enable
proper scrutiny of their decision-making processes by citizens in the member states covered
by a treaty or international institution.
A country’s participation in international organisations should not serve to undermine or
weaken democratic processes operating at the level of national politics. Changes of major
policies, treaties or how supra-national institutions operate should require an appropriate level
of active consent of citizens in the member states.
National elites dealing in cross-national bodies inevitably must play a ‘two-level game’,
negotiating for the best feasible deal at the international level in one way, and justifying their
actions to their national electorates in a somewhat different fashion. However, it is vital that
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elites listen to their public, and that effective (truthful) accountability is maintained.
The managers and staffs of cross-national and international organisations should be held
accountable for their actions in detail, with effective mechanisms in place to ensure that they
uphold legal and ethical responsibilities.
Recent developments
The UK is a member of many important international organisations and alliances, especially the European Union,
NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), the World Trade Organisation, and so on. These external links have
long been recognised as having relevant potential impacts on the quality of British democracy. This impact can be
both positive, where joining an international organisation may allow the UK to exert influence over global decisions
that affect British citizens. Alternatively, they may be negative, should participation in international decision-making
processes weaken the UK’s democratic framework, e.g. by narrowing the range of policy debates or options, or by
leading to elite collusion to exclude ‘unwise’ or ‘infeasible’ choices from the electorate’s consideration.
The 2012 Democratic Audit  noted that a lack of transparency and accountability in the decision-making processes
used in organisations such as the European Union and the World Trade Organization posed a tangible threat from a
democratic perspective. The audit also drew attention to the possibility that reductions in the budget of the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) could undermine the country’s capacity to secure influence over international
decisions that affect the UK. Despite some key developments and reforms which have taken place since 2012,
these threats continue to be relevant.
The most significant developments have occurred in relation to the UK’s membership of the European Union. David
Cameron announced in January 2013 that he would pursue a renegotiation and submit a new settlement to the
public as an ‘in/out’ referendum should the Conservatives win a majority at the 2015 general election. Following the
election, negotiations took place, with a final agreement reached in the European Council in February 2016.
There were two key elements of the Cameron renegotiation for British democracy. First was the provision of a ‘red
card’ procedure, under which national parliaments would be able to challenge EU proposals if 55 per cent of
parliamentary chambers registered opposition. Second, there were reforms aimed at safeguarding the UK’s position
from further integration into ‘ever closer union’, and especially not into the Eurozone. While in principle the red card
offers an extra element of accountability, previous research has demonstrated that the system would likely be in play
in only a very small number of cases. Similarly, with regard to the Eurozone, the deal would allow the UK to delay,
but not to block, certain proposals stemming from Eurozone states.
Beyond the renegotiation, other EU-wide reforms have also taken place since the previous audit. The 2014 round of
European Parliament elections included, for the first time, provisions to ‘elect’ the President of the European
Commission (the EU’s central bureaucracy, with powers to initiate new policy proposals) via the so called
Spitzenkandidaten process. This entailed each of the main European party families nominating a presidential
candidate prior to the election. The candidate from the parliamentary group that then received the most support from
voters would be appointed as the next President. There were some doubts as to whether the process would be
accepted by national governments. But in the end the nominee from the European People’s Party (EPP), Jean-
Claude Juncker, was duly appointed as Commission President following the EPP getting the most votes in the
election.
The Spitzenkandidaten process had the potential to address two of the most commonly cited arguments in the
context of the EU’s democratic deficit: the indirect appointment of the European Commission, and the lack of
engagement or low turnout in European Parliament elections. Judged by these standards, the impact on UK
democracy was fairly low. Turnout in the election in the UK was marginally higher than it had been in the previous
election in 2009 (35.6 per cent in 2014 as opposed to 34.7 per cent in 2009), but still well below UK general
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elections. British press or broadcast coverage of the candidates for President was minimal, unlike that in some other
EU countries. Moreover, the winning candidate was nominated by a European party (the EPP) that has no British
affiliated member (since the Conservatives left it). Alongside Hungary, the UK was also one of only two states to vote
against Juncker’s appointment following the election.
The public vote in the European Council on Juncker’s appointment was, however, a positive development for
transparency at the European level, given that EU appointment processes have previously been criticised for taking
place in negotiations behind closed doors. Previous research has demonstrated a general increase in transparency
in the EU’s Council of Ministers over the last two decades (its main executive body), albeit primarily in areas that
attract low levels of political controversy.
Some concerns over transparency and accountability raised in our 2012 audit continue to be relevant. While
transparency in the Council of Ministers may have increased, there has been a substantial increase in the number of
key decisions made through closed-door negotiations amongst heads-of-government during summits in the
confusingly named European Council – for example, this was the main way that decisions were made during the
2008-13 Eurozone crisis, the subsequent Greek debt crisis, and the 2015-16 migration crisis.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
Strengths Weaknesses
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The UK is a member state of the European Union, electing
a population -proportional number of MEPs to the European
Parliament via a well-working proportional representation
system. The UK also has the second largest number of
votes in the Council of Ministers when it is using the EU’s
QMV (qualified majority voting = 64% majority rule)
procedure. On many issues decided by unanimity the UK
has a complete veto on proposals (like all other member
states).
Britain also participates in a number of multinational
institutions which, in principle, put the country in a strong
position to influence decisions that affect British interests.
These include central roles in the World Bank (including the
right to appoint an Executive Director), the International
Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements
(where the UK is one of only six states that can appoint an
ex-officio Director), and the United Nations (the UK is one of
five permanent members of the UN Security Council). The
UK is also a full member of the World Trade Organization,
although the EU conducts WTO negotiations on behalf of all
its member states.
The UK clearly has considerable ‘soft power’ on the
international stage. It has consistently sat near the top of
the Institute for Government’s ‘soft power index’ (covering
cultural, social and economic influences, and how much a
country is looked to as an exemplar by other countries).
The 2012 index gave the UK the highest level of soft power
of all the countries included in the study.
The European Union continues to be
widely seen as suffering from a
democratic deficit. Only just over a
third of UK citizens vote for MEPs,
who remain little known. European
party names are also unknown to
almost all voters. Numerous UK
interest groups argue that Britain
does not have enough influence in EU
decisions. UKIP secured nearly a
quarter of votes at the 2014 European
elections, and many Conservative
MPs are Euro-sceptics.
The 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum
campaign has highlighted a deep
public distrust of the EU. UK
institutions command the loyalties of
British voters, but not EU ones. Only
around one in six Britons feel strongly
European, and it is very rare to see
EU flags displayed in the UK (unlike
the rest of western Europe).
There is, however, no guarantee that
leaving the European Union would
improve British democracy if it
reduces the country’s influence over
key areas with an impact on British
citizens – such as the legislation that
governs the EU’s single market.
Despite strong representation in
international organisations, the UK’s
influence also depends on its bilateral
relationship with individual states. In
some cases, as outlined in the
previous audit, there are reasons to
question the country’s record in
influencing key partners such as the
United States.
The Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) has experienced budget
cuts in recent years. A Foreign Affairs
Committee report in 2015 concluded
that these cuts have damaged the
FCO’s operations and questioned




Opportunities for positive change Future Threats
The 2016 referendum campaign on
whether the UK should leave the EU has
greatly increased citizen engagement
with and knowledge of European issues.
If ‘Remain’ wins, the democratic basis
on which UK governments seek to
influence outcomes within Europe
should be strengthened, with renewed
legitimacy for EU participation.
Should the UK leave the European
Union, there could be some potential to
drastically reshape the country’s
participation in international
organisations in a positive way.
Should the UK remain within the
European Union, it will hold the rotating
Presidency of the Council of the
European Union from July 2017, which
offers a platform for the UK to influence
the ongoing processes of reform taking
place at the European level.
The Brexit referendum could have long-term negative
consequences for the UK’s position within the EU, if there
is only a narrow or unconvincing majority for Remain.
If the Leave side wins, Britain’s capacity to shape
international outcomes may be impaired if it leads to a
long period of uncertainty about the UK’s status.
Should the UK remain within the European Union, and
some further integration within the Eurozone goes ahead,
the commanding position of the Eurozone countries in
the Council of Ministers may pose a potential issue for
the UK’s ability to influence QMV votes, since the
Eurozone countries acting as one bloc have (just) over
65% of votes there. This issue has only been partially
addressed by Cameron’s renegotiation completed in
February 2016.
Should the UK leave the European Union, the country’s
capacity to shape outcomes at the European level may
be undermined, despite these decisions still having a
tangible impact on the lives of UK citizens.
Uncertainty over the UK’s referendum on EU membership
Taken at face value, the fact that the British electorate will be able to cast a vote on the country’s relationship with the
European Union might be regarded as a positive development for UK democracy. The referendum allowed for a
clear articulation of the arguments for and against the European Union. It has also potentially facilitated greater
engagement from academia, think tanks, and other organisations in communicating the effects of European
integration to British citizens.
However, plebiscites of this kind are inherently highly coercive, with no compromises or deliberative softening of
issues possible. Thus they are highly imperfect instruments of democracy. Citizens who feel intense support for
either side of the issue will see their long-term futures and established rights shaped (perhaps irreversibly) by the
decision of a (possibly narrow) majority.
The lasting consequences of the referendum for democracy are more difficult to ascertain. It is easier to envisage
the kind of relationship that the UK would have with Europe if citizens choose to remain in the European Union. But
ongoing reforms at the European level may still adversely affect the UK’s present terms of membership.
A vote to leave the European Union would also generate uncertainty. Currently, no single model for an alternative
relationship with the European Union has widespread support among those actors campaigning to leave. A number
of possible options exist, including the negotiation of a ‘Norwegian’ or ‘Swiss’ style agreement that allows the UK to
continue to participate in the single market; the negotiation of a less comprehensive free trade agreement such as
that concluded between the EU and Canada; or simply relying on World Trade Organization rules to gain trade
access to European markets. We also do not know whether the remaining EU countries would wish to impose either
a harsh or a soft secession process on the UK.
The open-ended nature of the campaign therefore allows for both a positive and a negative interpretation of how a
leave vote could impact on UK democracy. Leave campaigners have argued that by restoring full national autonomy,
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and re-localizing issues currently fixed in Brussels, leaving the EU would improve British democracy. The danger in
this context would be if the UK’s alternative relationship following a leave vote resulted in having to accept many EU
rules and requirements while having no voice in what these are. The Norwegian model has long been criticised on
this basis, for instance, due to the country implementing EU legislation despite lacking full representation in the EU’s
institutions.
The EU’s ‘democratic deficit’
If the UK stays in the EU, there is little consensus on the nature of the ‘democratic deficit’ alleged by Eurosceptics. At
least five different critiques of EU democracy can be identified, shown in Table 1. We assesses how each issue has
developed since 2012 using this rating system: if steps have been taken to remedy the problem since 2012, but
without eliminating the issue entirely, a rating of ‘some improvement’ is assigned; or there could be ‘no improvement’
since 2012; and finally if the situation has deteriorated since the last audit, a rating of ‘problem has increased’ is
given.
Table 1: The EU’s democratic deficit and changes since 2012
Note: The five diagnoses of the democratic deficit are adapted from Follesdal and Hix (2006)
On point 1 there has been some tangible improvement since our 2012 audit. The powers of the European
Parliament have significantly increased as a result of the Lisbon Treaty entering into force. In the 2009-14
Parliament, no less than 89 per cent of legislative proposals were adopted using the so called ‘co-decision’
procedure (now called the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’). Under this rule legislation must be jointly agreed
between national governments in the Council and MEPs in the Parliament. As Chart 1 below shows, this is a marked
increase on previous parliamentary periods, where the bulk of legislation was determined using other procedures,
chiefly the ‘consultation’ procedure, in which the Council is not legally obliged to take account of the Parliament’s
opinion.
Chart 1: Percentage of legislative proposals adopted using the co-decision (ordinary legislative) procedure
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Source: European Parliament
This increase in power has not been matched, however, by an increase in turnout in European elections. Indeed, in
the 2014 elections, turnout across Europe fell again, with 17 out of 28 member states experiencing a drop from the
previous elections in 2009, although there was a small increase in the UK’s turnout.
On point 2, the power of national executives in relation to parliaments, there has been some modest change for the
better. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a ‘yellow card’ procedure (the forerunner to the ‘red card’ that formed part of
David Cameron’s renegotiation) which allows for an objection to be issued to an EU proposal by one third of EU
parliaments acting in unison. Although initially treated with scepticism, the procedure was successfully used for the
first time in May 2012 in response to the so called ‘Monti II Regulation’. It was again used in relation to the
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and has been used most recently in May 2016 in relation
to a revision of the Posted Workers Directive.
Finally, the effects of the Eurozone and migration crises seem to have had adverse effects on EU democracy. In both
cases, European Council and Eurogroup meetings have become the focus for decisions of substantial importance
for all European citizens. The UK is perhaps less involved on these issues (because it is outside both the Eurozone
and Schengen free movement area). But this much greater reliance on closed-door intergovernmental negotiations
to produce solutions to crises nevertheless represents a potentially worrying development for EU democracy, if the
European Parliament remains less involved and citizens are not given adequate representation.
Conclusion
Whatever the result of the UK’s referendum on EU membership, the country’s participation in cross-national and
international organisations will remain an important external factor in shaping the quality of British democracy.
Should the UK decide to stay within the European Union, developing greater transparency in decision-making and
strengthening the role of national parliaments in the EU’s legislative process offer two obvious routes for alleviating
the existing democratic problems at the European level. Alternatively, if the UK opts to leave the European Union, it
will be vital to establish a relationship with Europe where British citizens continue to have representation in key
international decisions that affect their interests, and can still gain from key rights (for example, to move between EU
countries).
This post does not represent the views of the London School of Economics or the LSE Public Policy Group.
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